Yemen Crisis - Legacy of a Forgotten Arab Cold War

Yemen, the name conjures up images of civil war, Houthi insurgency, attacks on Red Sea shipping, poverty, humanitarian crisis, and extreme human suffering. In the living memory of two generations, Yemen has been in the news for all the wrong reasons. It is a basket case and a classic example of a failed state. Yemen, the country as we know it today has constantly been at war of some kind for the past six decades, beginning in 1962. Most people analysing the country today and the civil war since 2014, focus on the issues in isolation from the larger problems that have long confronted Yemen. The current conflict and its manifestations should be seen as a continuation of over 60 years of violence, coups, assassinations, and open warfare. While a simplistic view would attribute current problems to armed resurrection by the Houthi’s, the truth is a complex combination of regional power rivalry, geography, ambition and religion, a lethal incendiary mix. Gamal Abdel Nasser, King Faisal, Arab Nationalism, Sunni-Shia dynamics, Tribal animosities, and the backdrop of US-Soviet global cold war – we need to study this broader complex mosaic and look back at the 1950’s and 60’s to build a context and better understand Yemen of today and all the associated problems.

Yemen – A Historic Context

More than a third of Yemenis are Shia Muslims but they are not Twelver Shia’s, which is the dominant form in Iran, but Zaydi’s or also known as Fiver Shia’s and are loyal to the Zaydi lineage known as Sayyid’s, descendants of Prophet Mohammed and who had ruled the country for a thousand years. Going back in history, one could trace the origins of the current conflict to the 9th-century arrival of Zaydi Islam in Yemen and the gradual emergence of a class of religious and political elites, the descendants of whom are currently leading the Houthi movement. The Zaydis started ruling Yemen beginning 893 CE and though initially based in the highlands and the northern territories, they eventually extended their dominance to most of the country and some provinces of current Saudi Arabia: Asir, Jizan and Najran. There were multiple Zaydi dynasties during the time span and starting in the sixteenth century, Ottomans exerted influence till their fall in 1918. The last of the Zaydi lineage to rule the country was the Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen, from 1918-1962. With only minor interruptions, the Zaydi lineage ruled in Yemen for thousand years until the creation of Yemen Arab Republic in 1962.

The Birth of modern Yemen started with “The Famous Forty”. In 1934, Yemen and the newly formed state of Saudi Arabia fought a brief war over disputed border territories claimed by both countries. Yemen lost the war and lost the territories of Jizan, Najran, and Asir to the Saudi Arabia. In an attempt to bring better military and administration capabilities to his country, Imam Yahya, the ruler of the Mutawakkilite Kingdom financed a study abroad program for 40 of the country’s most talented youth. Most of these students attended military colleges in Egypt and Iraq, while others pursued advanced degrees in Europe and in the US. Imam Yahya envisioned this group as his administration’s future leaders in military, politics, and industry and as expected, when they returned to Yemen, they constituted the core of the country’s civil service for the subsequent decades. But things turned out differently and much to the chagrin of the Imam, they had also imbibed many revolutionary ideals and were not content with the imam’s repressive rule, the lack of domestic infrastructure, or the dearth of opportunities for economic and social advancement.

Imam Yahya was assassinated in 1948 and was followed by a failed attempt to install a replacement imam. In the following decade there were multiple coup and assassination attempts on the life of Imam Ahmad, successor of Imam Yahya, until his death in September 1962. Seven days after Ahmad’s funeral, a republican movement led by the alumni of Yemen’s Famous Forty succeeded in overthrowing the last Imam, Muhammad al-Badr with the support from Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt.

Forgotten Egypt–Saudi Cold War in North Yemen, 1962 – 1970

No one generated more hope for the Arab’s than Gamal Abdel Nasser in the twentieth century. After the army overthrew the Egyptian Monarchy in 1952 and Nasser became the President in 1954, he promoted the concept of Arab Nationalism, which hoped to unite all the Arabic-speaking peoples from Morocco to Iraq and Oman within a single country. Nasser claimed that Egypt’s unique geography and historical legacy enhanced its ability to influence Africa, the Muslim world, and the Arab world. Nasser’s popularity soared after he nationalized the Suez canal in 1956 in defiance of the British, French and the Israeli’s. When the monarchy in Iraq fell to a army coup in 1958, it firmly entrenched what came to be called Nasserism in the Arab world.

While the passions of Arab streets were aroused by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and caused much of inter-Arab rivalry, Nasser’s secular, radical vision of Arab nationalism contrasted sharply with conservative, pro-Western Arab monarchies led by King Faisal of Saudi Arabia. Nasser’s Egypt, which represented a revolutionary, progressive model for Arab development also placed his country in perpetual conflict with the Monarchies and Autocracies of the Arab world, whom Nasser denounced as imperialists, reactionaries, and traitors. Nasser’s feud with Saudi Arabia began in the 1950’s after he overthrew King Farouk, his spectacular rise in popularity and his alliance with the Soviet Union coupled with his aversion to monarchical Arab regimes threatened Saudi Arabia. In March 1958, King Saud allegedly hatched a plot to assassinate Nasser by shooting down his plane. After the plot failed, Nasser used it as a proof that the Monarchies were puppets of colonial west to further ignite passions on the Arab street. It was against this background that Yemeni radicals and their ideas of deposing the Imamate appealed to Nasser and garnered his support.

Nasser had looked to a regime change in Yemen since 1957 and finally put his desires into practice in January 1962 by giving the rebels office space, financial support, and radio airtime. In September 1962, when the socialist republican officers in the Army overthrew Imam Mohammed Al-Badr and declared a Yemen Arab Republic, Al-Badr, refusing to surrender, fled to the northern mountains where he raised an army of royalists and tribals and received support from the Saudi’s. The Egyptians funnelled money, arms, and eventually ground troops to support revolutionaries in North Yemen and by October 1962 had 30,000 troops on the ground in Yemen. The Saudi’s who had a long-standing dispute on borders with Yemen, would not stand for the removal of a monarchy on their southern border and fearing a Nasserist encroachment, moved troops along its border with Yemen. The Saudis backed forces loyal to the former Imam and the tribal warriors who fought with him. Germany, the UK, The US and Jordan supported the Imam while Italy, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union declared support for the republicans. The USSR was the first nation to recognize the new republic and warned that any act of aggression against Yemen will be considered an act of aggression against the Soviet Union. The United States was concerned that the conflict might spread to other parts of the Middle East and President Kennedy tried to mediate between Egypt and Saudi Arabia. He suggested that Nasser withdraw his troops from Yemen, while Saudi Arabia and Jordan halted their aid to the Imam. Faisal rejected Kennedy's plan as it would tantamount to recognizing the YAR. The Saudis feared that Nasser eyed the Saudi oil fields and would use Yemen as a springboard for revolt in the rest of the Arabian peninsula.

What were Nasser's considerations for sending troops to Yemen? He was looking to cement his importance in the Arab world and also feed his ambition. He got carried away by the assumed impact of his support for the FLN in the Algerian war of independence 1954–62. When the United Arab Republic, his grand experiment with Syria fell apart in 1961, it was a blow to his prestige, and he had to show the Arabs that it was just a blip. It was also a way of getting back at Saudi’s, whom he blamed for plotting against UAR. Finally control of Yemen gave him dominance of the Red Sea from the Suez Canal to the Bab-El-Mandeb strait.

At its peak Egypt had deployed 60,000 troops in Yemen. During the course of the ensuing civil war, which officially ended in 1970, Egypt and Saudi Arabia were joined by over a dozen countries and organizations, turning into an international game of chess that served as a microcosm of global tensions. Located across the border from the British Empire in Aden, North Yemen was within the sphere of Egyptian expansionist influence and sitting astride one of the most important shipping lanes in the world, Yemen found itself at the center of events. It was a savage civil war and saw brutal conflicts and also the use of chemical weapons. But its most important legacy was tearing apart a social fabric that had existed for over a millennium and setting in motion, the forces that haunt us today.

Legacy of the Arab Cold War – Rise of Salafism

The end of the civil war in 1970 divided Yemen into two, North Yemen, controlled by the republicans and supported by the Saudi’s and Communist South Yemen, supported by the Soviet Union. But things were changing in North Yemen even during the civil war.

Between the ninth century and 1962, the succession of Yemeni imams, or religious leaders, adherent to the Zaydi branch of Shi’a Islam, was the only constant among the changing rulers. When a republic was declared on September 26, 1962, the institution of the imamate was dissolved. Though the traditional tribal leaders from the northern highlands still held positions of power, to challenge the legitimacy of the sayyids, who claimed a direct descent from the Prophet Muhammad, the Free Yemenis developed an Arab nationalist counter-narrative that would have long-term implications for Yemen’s internal cohesion. They introduced a new concept: “real” Yemenis were the descendants of the Qahtani’s – southern Arabian tribes that were the original inhabitants of Yemen. By contrast, they asserted that the sayyids ruling Yemen were Adnani’s – descendants of northern tribes that immigrated to southern Arabia following the arrival of Islam and became the rulers of Yemen. Over the course of the eight-year war this distinction helped the republicans entrench their position and in building a broad pro-republican consensus. This got further aggravated When Ali Abdullah Saleh became president in 1978 following the assassination of Ahmad al-Ghashmi. Saleh’s policies favored the rise of highland tribal sheikhs, challenging the formerly dominant sayyids and their allies.

Although the 1962 republican revolution in the north put an end to the Zaydi imamate, all five republican presidents who ruled were Zaydis. However, during the early years of the republic, Salafists began their activities in northern Yemen, backed by the Zaydi presidents. Saudi Arabia exerted and maintained immense influence over the presidents with their financial support, since they considered North Yemen to be a buffer state between the kingdom and the communist South Yemen. The first modern religious schools in Yemen were the ma’ahid ‘ilmiya set-up in the north in 1974. The number of institutes grew rapidly, with 500 in operation by 1982 and 1200 two decades later with 600,000 students. The ma’ahid ‘ilmiya formed a parallel education system that was dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood and became one of the group’s key recruitment tools. These schools were administratively and financially independent and received huge amounts of funding from the Saudi government, and private donors. The schools placed great emphasis on concepts of dawa (Islamic proselytization) and jihad and their curricula invariably followed hardline teachings close to those of Salafism. While the opponents of the schools were many, the most prominent of those were the Zaydi scholars and leading figures, who saw these institutes as dens of recruitment for the Muslim Brotherhood and as part of a Saudi effort to spread Salafism and extremism in Yemen.

The impact of Salafism got a further boost when Muqbil bin Hadi Al-Wadi’I returned to Yemen. He was a native Zaydi who changed his convictions during his stay in Saudi Arabia, got radicalized and was sentenced to prison on suspicion of taking part in the siege of Mecca. After being released from prison, he returned to Yemen and founded Dar Al-Hadith, which would become one of the most important and influential educational institutions for Salafism, teaching tens of thousands of students. Most of the institute’s teachers had studied at universities in Saudi Arabia and relied heavily on Saudi textbooks and the institute also received money from Saudi preachers close to Saudi Arabia’s ruling family.

Rise of the Houthis

Socially and politically, the most effected by the rise of Salafism in Yemen were the traditional Zaydi’s. First known as Ansar Allah, or Supporters of God, the grassroots Houthi movement began as a religious revivalist program during the 1990s in opposition to the Saudi proselytization and a more conservative Salafi interpretation of Islam. Badreddin al-Houthi was born in 1926, attended religious seminaries and became a Shia cleric serving the Mutawakkil Imamate. Like many Zaydis he resented the republicans, and his anger grew against the Saleh lead government, which had given a free reign to the Saudi backed Wahhabi missionaries. In 1990, Badreddin formed his own party and started to engage seriously in politics. He was joined by his son, Hussein Al-Houthi who in 1992 founded a social organization to help the Zaydi maintain their faith, setting up schools and summer camps.

Badreddin and Hussein argued that there was a global plot against all Muslims and the Yemen’s rulers lead by Saleh were a part of it. They accused him of being a puppet of the Saudi’s and Americans. In 2003, after the American invasion of Iraq, influenced by Hezbollah, Hussein’s slogan “death to America, death to Israel, curse upon the Jews, victory to Islam” spread like wildfire throughout the Zaydi mosques and religious schools, highlighting an association between the regime of Saleh and growing anti-American sentiments across the Middle East. Zaydi religious opposition to the Yemeni republic was perceived as a threat to Saleh’s regime and eventually led to an armed confrontation between the Houthi family supporters and Yemeni forces. Hussein Al-Houthi resisted Saleh's order for his arrest and was later killed by the Yemeni military in Saada in 2004, sparking the Houthi insurgency. Since Husseins death, the movement has been mostly led by his brother Abdul-Malik al-Houthi.

This clash between Saleh’s army and Houthis resulted in what is now called, “Six Saada Wars”, fought between 2004 to 2010. Despite its overwhelming military advantage, Yemeni forces were unable to defeat the Houthi rebellion, and the fighting divided the population. Instead of putting down the rebellion, the government’s military campaigns triggered destructive cycles of violence and counter-violence in Saada’s tribal environment, which eventually engulfed whole of North Yemen. People became increasingly polarized along government-Houthi lines and from the beginning of the second war significant number of people joining the Houthi ranks were no longer religiously or ideologically motivated but were drawn into the conflict for other reasons. The conflict took on an international dimension in November 2009 when the Houthis, accusing the Saudi’s of backing Saleh, attacked the Saudi border, killed one of the border guards and seized villages. Saudi Arabia responded by launching heavy air strikes on rebels in northern Yemen and moved troops nearer the border.

Matters came to head during the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011. There were massive protests and demonstrations against Saleh in Yemen. Abdul-Malik al-Houthi immediately announced his support for the pro-democracy demonstrations and during the course of 2011, occupied Saada and engaged in multiple armed confrontations with the Yemeni forces. Saleh abdicated in 2012, but Houthis continued their struggle under his successor Mansur al-Hadi, which resulted violent military clashes over the next two years, eventually resulting in the Houthi’s capturing Saana in 2014. This led to the military campaign by the coalition led by Saudi Arabia and UAE, that has seen years of brutal conflict and human suffering, with the coalition trapped in a quagmire with no resolution in sight.

Enter Iran – The New Arab Cold War

Iran-aligned Houthi movement is emerging as one of the Middle East’s most potent nonstate actors. They have been successfully disrupting the Red Sea shipping as an act against Israel’s war in Gaza. Iranian support has boosted the military prowess of the Houthis and has made them an effective player in Iran’s anti-West axis of resistance. But when did this Iranian support for the Houthis begin? In the late 1980s, after the end of decade long war with Iraq, Iran set its sight beyond its immediate neighbourhood to export the ideals of Islamic revolution. Iran moved closer to Yemen and in the early 1990s, Iran accommodated Houthi religious students, among them was Hussein al-Houthi, who was to lead the Houthi insurgency. In the early 2000’s, when Saleh was looking to persecute the Houthi leadership, Iran also provided safe haven to Hussein al-Badr in Qom.

Following the departure of Saleh in 2012, Iranian officials openly started supporting the Houthis through public ideological pronouncements. The simmering and long-lasting Iran-Saudi rivalry resulted into Iran strengthening their support materially and militarily after Saudi led coalition started a war against them in 2014. But unlike Hezbollah or the Shia factions in Iraq, the Houthi are not an Iranian proxy in the sense of unquestioningly doing what Iran wants. They are best looked at as an informal partner, whose relationship has evolved from a partnership of convenience into a more strategic one. The core aim of the Houthis is to regain their previous political authority in Yemen and fighting the Saudi led coalition and the anti-Israel rhetoric and actions in the Red Sea are a means to this end. Iran has little influence on this objective and the Houthis have remained autonomous with respect to their domestic constituencies, political strategy, and battlefield operations.

Despite their diverging broader aims, currently they have a common enemy in Israel and the long running feud with Saudi Arabia. As Kamran Bokhari of Geopolitical Futures pointed out:

“Although the Houthis maintain that their attacks will continue until Israel stops its military campaign in Gaza, the group’s more immediate goal is to use the Israel-Hamas war to cement itself as the strongest force in Yemen. None of this would be possible without Iran, which not only helps to fund, equip and train the Houthis but also uses them to project power in strategic waters far from Iran’s borders. Approximately 12 percent of global trade passes through the mouth of the Red Sea, including 30 percent of global container traffic. More broadly, the Houthis’ rise in Yemen – especially in the most densely populated areas on the Red Sea coast and along the border with Saudi Arabia – is a key component in the Iranian strategy to encircle the Saudis.”

After the beginning of hostilities in 2014, a primary goal of the Saudi and UAE led coalition was to ensure that the Houthis did not get complete control of Yemen’s main Red Sea port of Hodeida. But despite their numerous attempts and their fire power, the coalition was forced to the negotiating table and had to finally cede Hodeida to the Houthis in 2021. This has emboldened the Houthis to focus on getting a regional upper hand and dictate terms on the Red Sea. The war in Gaza has been a god sent opportunity for them and they hope to capitalize on the sentiment to strengthen their position in Yemen. For Iran, this provides a great opportunity to gain from a from a more robust forward operation base in the backyard of its Saudi rivals. To further add Kamran Bokhari’s views:

” Though they agreed to normalize ties in March as part of an ostensibly Chinese-mediated deal, the Iranians and the Saudis remain wary of each other. From Tehran’s point of view, Riyadh’s efforts to normalize relations with Israel pose a threat to Iran’s position in the region. Likewise, the Saudis know that Iran will continue to undermine the kingdom’s regional position through its constellation of proxies, just as it has done with Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis since Hamas’ Oct. 7 attack in Israel.”

Final Words – Only Middle East Can Save Middle East

Over the past couple of weeks, I have read quite a bit about Yemen and in detail on the topics I have touched upon in this article. Same question kept repeating? Who is responsible for this mess? There is no clear-cut answer and difficult to pinpoint when? what? and why? But one thing was crystal clear - This is a self-inflicted mess for the region and unfortunately, there are no outsiders to blame. It has become common, convenient and fashionable to blame all the problems in the region to Israel, America, and the Colonial legacy. No denying the fact that these players have contributed to the ills, but equal and important factor has been the regional players themselves. Leaders like Nasser driven by their vainglory, deluded ambitions and misguided policies have done more harm to the region than outsiders. Middle East has not been able to shake out of its tribal mentality, animosities, and sectarian divisions. Unless the region figures out a way to overcome their differences and put aside their ideological differences, there will be outsiders who will take advantage of it for their benefit.